Abstract. We argue that Nash's solution to the bargaining problem should be modified such that it will be based on a New Reference Point (NRP). Such a point is needed so that a player is not considered 'individually rational' if he accepts an agreement that provides him with a utility lower than the minimal utility he can derive from any Pareto optimal agreement, or if he accepts an agreement that provides him a utility lower than the one he can obtain by unilateral action. The employment of such NRP requires modifying two axioms and hence leads to a new proposed solution.
Introduction
One of the most famous contributions to game theory was Nash's (1950) solution to the (two-person) bargaining problem. In this article Nash described the two-person bargaining problem, proposed a number of axioms that, in his opinion, a rational and fair solution of the problem should satisfy, and proved that there always exists a unique solution point that satisfies these axioms.
The two-person bargaining set is a set of points, S, denoting the utilities a and u derived by two bargainers, A and U, from all possible trades between them. The set S is bounded, convex and closed, and contains the status quo (aka maximin) point (a 0 , u 0 ), denoting the utility that each of the bargainers can obtain by unilateral action.
The bargaining problem is determining which (unique) point (a*, u*) ought to be selected as the most reasonable agreement between the two bargainers. Obviously the selected point depends, inter alia, on the particular properties (axioms) one wishes that this point should satisfy. Nash's solution to the bargaining problem, F(S, (a 0 , u 0 )) = (a*, u*), is the unique point for which (a* -a 0 ) (u* -u 0 ) ≥ (a -a 0 ) (u -u 0 ) for all (a , u) ∈ S. It satisfies the following axioms:
1. Individual rationality: a* ≥ a 0 and u* ≥ u 0 2. Feasibility: (a*, u*) ∈ S.
3. Pareto optimality: If (a, u) ∈ S and (a, u) ≥ (a*, u*), then (a, u) = (a*, u*).
Independence of irrelevant alternatives:
If S' is a subset of S containing both (a 0 , u 0 ) and (a*, u*), then F(S', (a 0 , u 0 )) = F(S, (a 0 , u 0 )). In some presentations the first three axioms are combined into a single axiom entitled "Pareto optimality" (see e.g., Luce and Raiffa, 1957:127) . 1 The meaning of the first axiom is that a player should not be considered 'individually rational' if he accepts an agreement that provides him a utility lower than the one he can obtain by unilateral action. We argue that, in addition, a player should not be considered 'individually rational' if he accepts an agreement that provides him with a utility lower than the minimal utility he can derive in case the parties reach a Pareto optimal agreement. We believe that both these utility points would be used as anchors by an arbitrator asked by the parties to propose a reasonable agreement.
Following this logic, we define in the next section a Minimal Utility Point (MUP), as well as a New Reference Point (NRP), which are based on Roth's (1977) as well as on our requirements from 'individual rationality'. The definition of NRP results in modifications of the first and fourth axioms, and in a new proposed solution of the bargaining problem.
Definitions, modified axioms, and a new proposed solution
Let (a', u") be a feasible Pareto optimal point where A obtains his highest possible utility in S, and let (a", u') be a feasible Pareto optimal point where U obtains his highest possible utility in S. It therefore follows that the point depicting the minimum utilities of both players in case they reach a Pareto optimal agreement is MUP = (a", u"). This minimal utility point need not belong to S.
The MUP point is important in determining what should be the relevant 'bargaining universe' within S. Following our argument that one should use as reference points both (a 0 , u 0 ) and (a", u"), we define a new reference point NRP = (a^, u^), where:
(ii) u^ = max (u 0 , u").
By employing this new reference point we now modify Nash's axiom 1 (individual rationality) and axiom 4 (independence of irrelevant alternatives) as follows:
Modified axiom 1: a* ≥ a^ and u* ≥ u^ By employing Nash's original proof it is easy to prove that based on these modified axioms and the original axioms 2, 3, 5, and 6, Nash's modified bargaining solution that we propose is the unique point (a*, u*) for which (a* -a^) (u* -u^) ≥ (a -a^) (u -u^) for all (a, u) ∈ S.
Examples
We demonstrate the possible differences between Nash's original solution and our proposed modification of this solution by means of the following examples.
Example 1. Assume that:
(1) Two players, A and U, must divide between them 100 utiles;
(2) (a 0 , u 0 ) = (0 , 0) (i.e., if A and U fail to reach an agreement they get nothing); -6 -(3) (a", u") = (0, 0) (i.e., it is possible for the players to reach an agreement where one of them gets all the 100 utiles while the other gets nothing).
In this case both the original Nash solution as well as our modification of this solution awards each player 50 utiles. Now suppose that, ceteris paribus, assumption (3) above is changed such that:
(3) (a", u") = (0, 20) (i.e., that if A and U reach a Pareto optimal agreement, then U must get, for some reason, at least 20 utiles and, therefore, A cannot get more than 80 utiles).
In this case the original Nash solution would still be (50, 50), while our modified Nash solution would be (40, 60).
Example 2. Assume that:
(2) (a 0 , u 0 ) = (40, 0). As is demonstrated in the following example, the logic of reference to MUP in solving a two-person bargaining problem was invoked already a long time ago.
Example 3. The Babylonian Talmud discusses a case where two persons, A and U, argue over a division of a talit. 2 A claims that the entire talit belongs to him while U claims only half of the talit. Both A and U know that if they fail to reach an agreement the talit will be confiscated by the authorities and they will get nothing.
So if we apply our notation we have here a situation where (a 0 , u 0 ) = (0, 0) while (a", u") = (1/2, 0). Consequently, here, too, the original Nash solution would be 
Conclusion
It has been demonstrated in two independent laboratory experiments (Felsenthal and Diskin, 1982; Schellenberg, 1988) that the majority of actual players confronted with similar two-person bargaining problems where (a'', u'') > (a 0 , u 0 ), adopted agreements which were much closer to our modified Nash solution than to other investigated solutions, including the original Nash solution. We hope that this note supplies a normative justification to their behavior.
Employment of reference points similar to MUP was later suggested by others.
Thus, Conley, McLean and Wilkie (1997) used a similar idea to prove that impossibilities of social choice theory are often derived from lack of a proper reference point, and that when a point similar to MUP is employed these impossibilities are 'solved'. Another quite well-known reference to MUP is that of Herrero (1998) . To the best of our knowledge the employment of both (a'', u'') and
has not yet been suggested. Dagan, Volij and Winter (2002) proved that Nash's axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives may be substituted by three other axioms such that his unique solution of the bargaining problem does not change. It therefore follows that when this substitution is made coupled with the employment of NRP and modifying the axiom of Individual Rationality as we have, one obtains a solution to the bargaining problem which is identical to our proposed modified Nash solution.
Moreover, even if one views the set of axioms underlying an alternative solution to the two-person bargaining problem -e.g., that proposed by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) -as more reasonable than the set of axioms proposed by Nash, we would still hold that it ought to be modified by employing a modified Individual Rationality axiom. 4 It also seems that a reference point similar to NRP should be used in situations where more than two bargainers are involved.
